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We examine effects of entering the labor market during a recession on subsequent earnings 
and employment for Japanese and American men, using comparable household labor force 
surveys. Previous analyses focus on search theoretic and implicit-contract arguments, which 
have their strongest effects on more educated workers. We argue that, in a country like Japan 
which has a dual labor market, there is an additional mechanism that affects mainly less 
educated workers. Namely, these workers are more likely to be trapped in the secondary 
sector if they graduate during a recession. We find a persistent, strong negative effect on 
earnings for less educated Japanese men, in contrast to no long-term effect for less educated 
American men; also, a substantial part of the effect for less educated Japanese men is 
attributed to the decreased probability of regular employment. The effect for the more 
educated group is more or less similar in both countries. 
 




| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
here is increasing evidence that labor market conditions at graduation affect 
subsequent wages and employment prospects (Ohtake and Inoki, 1997, for Japan; 
Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2006, for Canada; Kahn, 2006, for the United 
States). These studies typically draw on a combination of search and contracting models to 
interpret the persistent negative effect of graduating during a recession. Probably because 
both search frictions and implicit contracts are thought to be more relevant to skilled 
workers with strong attachment to the labor force, they tend to focus on male college 
graduates or employees in relatively large establishments. However, if it is difficult to move 
up to regular jobs in the primary market from low-paying unstable jobs in the secondary 
market, a recession at graduation can have a permanent effect on less educated people by 
making it more likely that they will fall into the secondary market. 
This paper sheds light on the effect of graduating during a recession for less educated men, 
who have been largely ignored in the existing studies, by cross comparison across the less and 
the more educated groups in Japan and the United States. As we elaborate in Section 3, the 
hiring market for new graduates in Japan is isolated from the rest of the labor market and a 
distinction between regular and provisional jobs is prominent. Hence, if a recession at entry 
traps some of the affected cohort in unstable employment in subsequent years, there will be 
considerable penalty of graduating during a recession for less educated men. On the other 
hand, the division between regular and provisional jobs is subtle in the United States, and 
the labor market is more like a continuum of different kind of jobs than two distinct markets 
with a clear boundary. Thus, American men can serve as the “control group” in a broad sense 
to identify the effect that comes from being trapped in unstable, non-regular employment. 
We estimate the effects of labor market conditions (namely, the unemployment rate) at entry 
using two comparable cross-sectional household surveys: the Labor Force Survey in Japan 
and the Current Population Survey in the United States. With controls for year- and region- 
fixed effects and region specific linear trends, we find that a recession at entry has a strong 
and persistent negative effect on subsequent earnings for less educated Japanese men, a 
weaker but still substantial effect for more educated Japanese men, a modest, gradually 
fading effect for more educated American men and only a temporary effect for less educated 
American men. The contrasting patterns across groups with different educational 
background are striking. We also find a significant negative effect on employment status for 
less educated Japanese men. Further, inclusion of the ratio of regular workers in total 
population of the cohort narrows the difference in coefficients of the unemployment rate at 
entry between less and more educated Japanese men, and the loss of earnings is concentrated 
to the lower part of earnings distribution in Japan. These findings support our view that 
duality between regular and non-regular employment plays an important role in generating a 
persistent negative effect of high unemployment at labor market entry for less educated 
Japanese men. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the effect of labor market conditions at 
entry separately for less educated American men and compare it with that for the more 
educated group. Our finding of a less persistent penalty of graduating during a recession for 
less educated American men suggests that the market for less skilled worker is closer to a spot 
market, since they are known to be more sensitive to contemporaneous labor market 
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fluctuations, especially downturns (Cutler and Katz, 1991; Hines, Hoynes and Krueger 
2001). At the same time, the strong, persistent effect for less educated Japanese men suggests 
that, when the labor market exhibits duality, less skilled workers in unlucky cohorts suffer 
from long-term loss of earnings. This could be also the case in other countries where regular 
workers are protected by dismissal regulation and provisional/temporary employment 
contracts exist as a loophole.1 
An additional motivation for looking at less educated Japanese men is that the deteriorated 
employment situation of the young Japanese who entered the labor market during the 
prolonged recession of the mid-1990s through the early 2000s is a growing social concern. 
As highlighted by Genda (2001), the cost of this recession was born disproportionately by 
young people who were on the course of transition from school to full-time work, since 
cutting new hiring was much easier than firing incumbent workers. The fraction of the 
young labor force not in regular full-time employment has sharply increased since the 1990s. 
Repairing the employment prospects of these young people stranded out of the “regular” 
track has emerged as a pressing issue, under the growing fear of future expansion of the 
poverty group and an increasing burden of social security. To find an effective solution, we 
need to understand how labor market conditions at entry affect each individual’s subsequent 
outcomes, who is affected the most, and how persistent the effects will be. 
On this point, we substantially improve on the existing studies that look at the Japanese 
labor market, including Ohtake and Inoki (1997), in terms of the methodology and data 
coverage. The most important improvement is that we control for unobserved year-specific 
components by exploiting regional variations in unemployment rates.2 Second, we examine 
the persistence of the effect by allowing the effect to vary with the years since entry. Third, 
our dataset spans 1986 to 2005, allowing us to look at outcomes in several years after entry 
for those who entered the labor market in the late 1990s, after the long recession started. 
Lastly, the use of household surveys allows us to examine the effect on employment status as 
well, which was unfeasible with the establishment survey data used by the existing studies in 
Japan. Also, our finding of a negative effect of a recession at entry on the ratio of regular 
employment provides evidence that the individual-level effect of failing to obtain a regular 
job at entry shown by Sakai and Higuchi (2005) and Kondo (2007a) leads to decline in 
regular employment at the cohort level. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews underlying 
mechanisms that make labor market conditions have persistent effects on subsequent 
earnings and employment. Section 3 describes the institutional features we think important, 
the hiring market for new graduates and duality between regular and non-regular jobs. 
Section 4 describes data and methodology and examines comparability of Japanese and 
American data. Empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1In fact, studies using Spanish data (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000) and Italian data (Gagliarducci, 2005) 
report difficulty in transition to permanent jobs from repeated temporary jobs similar to what is 
observed in Japan. 
2Most of the existing studies use the national unemployment rate and include a linear or quadratic 
trend term, probably because the regional rates prior to 1983 are not available. 
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| 2 | UNDERLYING MECHANISMS 
n this section, we review two different mechanisms that can produce a persistent effect of 
labor market conditions at graduation. The first line consists of the theories that explain 
how the advantage of obtaining a better job at entry lasts for several years, including 
implicit long-term contracts and search models. Since the advantage of obtaining a high-
wage job at entry vanishes when the worker is dismissed, these factors are expected to affect 
more educated workers and regular employees, who are presumably less likely to be dismissed. 
On the other hand, the second half of this section argues that a recession at entry can keep 
some less educated people away from regular employment when there is a substantial 
discontinuity between regular jobs and non-regular jobs, which is the case in Japan. This sort 
of penalty of graduating during a recession through chronic unstable employment is expected 
to be stronger for less educated people, given that they are more likely to fail to obtain a 
regular full-time job due to lack of demand. 
In the United States, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) find that incumbent workers’ wages rise 
during booms but do not fall during recessions as long as the workers remain employed, and 
they explain this by implicit long-term wage contracts with mobile workers. That is, firms 
cannot dismiss workers or cut their wages during a recession while they have to raise wages to 
keep workers from the better outside options. Hence, the benefit from obtaining a high-
paying job upon graduation due to the tight labor market can last for years and it can take 
several years to catch up for those who graduate during a recession. Oreopoulos et al (2006) 
emphasize the role of time intensive search and the existence of (implicit or explicit) long-
term wage contracts as the mechanisms underlying the persistent negative effect of 
graduating during a recession on subsequent wages in Canada. That it takes time to dissolve 
initial matches also means that turnover rates among those who enter the labor market 
during a recession stay high for several years after entry. Bowlus (1995) shows that a job that 
started during a recession tends to end sooner in the United States, implying deteriorated 
matching quality, and Oreopoulos et al (2006) find similar evidence on mobility with their 
Canadian data. Also, at least for large firms, there is evidence that external labor market 
conditions at entry to the firm affect long-term wage setting within the firm (Baker, Gibbs 
and Holmstrom,1994). 
Similarly, Ohtake and Inoki (1997) report a positive correlation between labor demand in 
the year of graduation and subsequent wages in Japan. Further, Ohta (1998) and Genda and 
Kurosawa (2001) find that the unemployment rate at graduation is positively correlated with 
the subsequent quitting rate, and Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa (2000) report a within-firm 
cohort effect similar to Baker et al (1994) in a large Japanese firm. Given the lower turnover 
rate in Japan, the process of dissolving initial bad matches is expected to take a longer time in 
Japan; actually, Genda and Kurosawa (2001) find that, unlike Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), 
the best labor market conditions that the cohort ever experienced have no effect, implying 
that worker mobility is limited in Japan. Also, it has been said that Japanese firms invest 
more in training their employees than American firms (Mincer and Higuchi, 1988; 
Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985). These factors can enhance the advantage of obtaining a 
better job at entry in Japan. Nevertheless, if these factors were the only causes, the resulting 
penalty of graduating during a recession should be stronger for more educated men in both 
Japan and in the United States, since long-term regular employment is more relevant to 
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more educated workers.3 
On the other hand, if the labor market is divided into two sectors, one for high-paying jobs 
with long-term employment and the other for unstable, provisional jobs, and a worker gets 
stuck with the market that he falls into upon graduation, labor market conditions at entry 
can have permanent effect on wages and employment prospects for those who are likely to 
fall into the secondary market under slack labor demand. At the individual level, there is 
evidence that failure to obtain a regular full-time job upon graduation lowers the likelihood 
of having a regular full-time job in subsequent years in Japan (Sakai and Higuchi, 2005; 
Kondo, 2007a). Kondo (2007a) argues that leaving school without obtaining a regular full-
time job works as a bad signal, because those who couldn’t obtain a job at graduation are 
adversely selected on average. 
However, it is not obvious whether this adverse effect for each person who fails to obtain a 
regular job at entry leads to a negative effect of labor market conditions at entry at the cohort 
level. The average productivity of people who graduate without obtaining a regular job 
during a recession is higher than the average productivity of people who graduate without 
obtaining a regular job during a boom, because more people can obtain a regular job during 
a boom. Therefore, the increased number of new graduates who fail to obtain a regular job 
may be canceled out by the improved average productivity of these workers. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that a recession at entry has a negative effect at the cohort level 
when the gap between regular full-time jobs and non-regular jobs is substantial. More 
specifically, suppose: (1) more productive workers are matched with better (in some sense) 
jobs in the hiring market for regular jobs for new graduates, (2) a worker’s employment 
history is observable without costs, while firms have to incur some screening costs to observe 
actual productivity, and (3) provisional jobs that a worker has experienced have little 
information about his productivity because the market for provisional workers is a spot 
market. The third assumption means that many people are bunched into a group of “those 
not in regular employment.” That is, the firms cannot distinguish people at the margin 
(almost as productive as workers in the lowest ranked regular job) from those at the very 
bottom unless they incur the screening costs. Hence, there is a gap in the expected 
productivity between those in the lowest ranked regular full-time job and those without a 
regular full-time job. If a firm interviews an applicant without experience in regular 
employment, there is a good chance that they will find that he is not productive enough for 
the job after incurring the screening costs. Thus, even if the firm knows that some of the 
people who graduate without obtaining a regular job in years with low labor demand are 
more productive than people who obtain the lowest ranked regular job in years with high 
labor demand, it may well prefer an applicant who got the lowest ranked regular job in a year 
with high labor demand to one who graduated without obtaining a regular job in a year with 
low labor demand. 
                                                 
3Ohtake and Inoki (1997) estimate the cohort-specific component of wages separately by education, 
and its correlation with the unemployment rate at entry is actually slightly more negative for high 
school graduates than for college graduates. Although they do not go into this point further, we think 
their results capture a part of the effect through the decline in regular employment, which this paper 
focuses on, even though their sample is limited to those who are employed (including those on fixed-
term contracts of longer than a month) by the surveyed establishments. 
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In reality, firms might not take the difference across cohorts fully into account, and negative 
perceptions against young people who are not settled in stable employment could also 
worsen the subjective expectation. In any case, firms do not recruit their regular employees 
from the pool of non-regular workers and unemployed people regardless of the labor market 
conditions at their entry to the market. The loss of work experience on the regular 
employment track may also lower the average productivity of the cohort in the long-run and 
aggravate the loss of earnings, but this is more like a consequence than a cause.4 
The discontinuity in expected productivity between regular and non-regular workers is 
essential to produce a cohort-level decline in regular employment. Screening costs exist and 
assortative matching is observed, and the market for unskilled workers is closer to a spot 
market than the market for skilled workers both in the United States and in Japan. However, 
as the next section explains in detail, the discontinuity between the markets for regular and 
non-regular jobs is prominent only in Japan; the U.S. labor market is more like a continuum 
of markets with different degree of sorting on skills. In the absence of a discrepancy between 
regular and non-regular jobs, the effect of a recession at entry on earnings is likely to be less 
persistent for the less educated group, who are presumably more likely to be dismissed, 
because the advantage of obtaining a high-wage job at entry vanishes when the worker is 
dismissed. Hence, we expect the effect of a recession at entry for the less educated group 
compared to that for the more educated group will be stronger for Japanese men. 
 
                                                 
4Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) find that the earning losses due to displacement is not 
permanent but gradually fades away in five years in the United States, and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) 
confirm this using a sample of young workers only. Further, von Wachter and Bender (2006) show 
that a large part of the persistent earning losses due to early job loss for young Germans is attributable 
to the difference in employer characteristics, and once employer characteristics is controlled for the 
losses become temporary like in the United States. 
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| 3 | INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
apan’s employment system is characterized by long-term employment beginning right 
after the completion of education and lasting until mandatory retirement. An obvious 
consequence of this so-called “life-time” employment system is long job tenure and high 
job-retention rates for prime-aged male workers.5 Another important consequence of the life-
time employment system is two-tier structure within an employer. To keep their regular 
employees during recessions, many Japanese firms also hire workers on fixed term contracts 
or part-time basis as a buffer. Although there is no explicit legal definition, regular full-time 
workers (called seishain in Japanese) and other provisional/part-time workers are clearly 
distinguished in practice. A seishain, or a regular employee, works full-time and is on an 
employment contract that does not specify the date of termination of the contract.6 Non-
regular workers are usually called “arubaito”, a Japanese word meaning side workers or just-
in-time workers, or a “part-timer” regardless of how many hours she actually works. 
Termination of fixed term contracts is relatively easy, in contrast to the tight dismissal 
protection on the regular workers under the so-called just cause case law (kaikoken ranyou 
houri).7 Moreover, the case law requires employers to make every effort to avoid dismissal of 
regular workers, including termination of temporary and part-time workers and suspending 
new hiring; this shows that not only employers but also authorities regard non-regular 
workers as a buffer that protects employment of regular workers. 
In addition to the different degree of employment protection, the hiring market for the 
regular full-time workers and that for the non-regular provisional workers work quite 
differently. Schools play an important roll in matching students with their prospective 
employers, especially for high school students, in the market for regular jobs. Consequently, 
the hiring market for new graduates is isolated from the rest of the labor market, which 
allows firms to discriminate between those who have not entered the labor market and those 
who have failed to obtain a regular job. Also, the resulting matching is highly assortative. In 
contrast, new graduates and other young applicants are treated in the same way in the market 
for provisional jobs, which is more or less a spot market. Hence, the labor market for 
Japanese youth fits the situation considered in the previous section, where a recession at 
entry leads to a decline in regular employment at the cohort level. 
The school-based hiring system, a matching system between the senior students in high 
school and regular full-time jobs based on long-term relationships between high schools and 
firms, is the major way for high school students to find a job after their graduation. Local 
public Employment Service Agencies (kokyo shokugyo antei-jo) also provide a separate list of 
                                                 
5For instance, the average tenure of men at age 30-34 in 2000 is about 8.5 years in Japan, while it is 
about 5 years in the United States. Note that the difference in turnover rates between more and less 
educated Japanese workers is similar to that of American workers: in both countries, the turnover rate 
of high school educated workers is higher than that of college educated workers. 
6In some occasions, even if an employee satisfies the two conditions, she is not considered as a 
“regular” employee. Thus, many surveys including the Labor Force Survey directly ask how the 
respondent is called by the employer to classify regular and non-regular workers. 
7Although there had been no statutory law until the 2004 reform of the Labor Standard Law, 
kaikoken ranyou houri had made the dismissal of regular workers for economic reasons practically very 
difficult. See, for example, Passet (2003) for details. 
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vacancies explicitly for new high school graduates to support schools and students. As Ariga 
(2005) emphasizes, long-term relationships with schools and intervention by the 
Employment Service Agency effectively makes the employers treat new graduates and other 
job applicants differently. Consequently, the market for new high school graduates is isolated 
from the rest of the labor market.8 
Unlike high schools, colleges usually do not directly mediate their students and potential 
employers, except for some specialists in the engineering and science majors. A number of 
large private placement-service agencies play a central role in the job market for college 
graduates, instead of public Employment Service Agencies. Nevertheless, the hiring market 
for new college graduates is also separated from the rest of the labor market to some extent, 
because many vacancies for regular full-time jobs explicitly target senior students in college. 
The private placement-service agencies also distinguish new graduates from other job seekers, 
though not as strictly as the public Agencies. A typical recruiting process starts more than a 
year prior to graduation and takes several months, also posing difficulties to unemployed 
people with credit constraints. 
The likelihood that a new graduate obtains a full-time regular job is pro-cyclical and on a 
declining trend. Yet, the proportion of new graduates who immediately obtain a full-time 
regular job was still as high as 79.8 % for high school graduates and 90.9% for four-year 
college graduates in 1997, according to the Survey of Young Employees. Also, the Survey 
shows that 68.1 % of male regular employees at age 25-29 in 1997 had never changed their 
employer. Moreover, Kato (2001) shows that neither the job-retention rate nor the average 
tenure of regular employees, with controls for the age composition, has declined since the 
1980s. Regular full-time workers remain in long-term employment as before, despite the 
decreasing number of new entrants to regular full-time jobs. 
In contrast, transition from education to stable employment in the United States is gradual 
and often takes several years. Schools do not intervene in the matching process between new 
graduates and jobs; at least, there is nothing like the Japanese school-based hiring system for 
high school students. Also, young workers change jobs very frequently. Topel and Ward 
(1992) report that two-thirds of all new jobs among young workers end in the first year. 
Neal (1999) shows that many job changes among young workers involve changes in industry 
and occupations, emphasizing the importance of searching for well matched career. He also 
shows less educated workers tend to change industry and occupation more frequently. Lynch 
(1999) presents the relatively high employment rate among young Americans still in school 
as another side of gradual transition from school to work in the United States. This gradual 
transition makes it difficult for firms to tell who “failed” at entry to the labor market in the 
United States. 
Probably due to the weak restrictions on dismissals in general, the distinction between fixed-
term and indefinite employment contracts is relatively unimportant in the United States. 
Also, though governmental surveys such as the Current Population Surveys distinguish part-
time workers from full-time workers based on hours of work, there is no discontinuity in 
                                                 
8However, many troubles with the system have arisen since the mid-1990s as both the demand for 
and the supply of high school graduates have declined. Ariga (2005) provides detailed description of 
the system and what went wrong in the 1990s. 
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earnings at any particular hours of work per week.9 Thus, a commonly recognized 
dichotomous classification of workers similar to regular and non-regular workers in Japan 
does not exist in the United States. Of course there are substantial differences between high-
paying skilled jobs and low-paying unskilled jobs in the United States, but the distribution of 
jobs seems to be continuous. 
To summarize, there are two notable differences between Japan and the United States. First, 
the discrepancy between regular and non-regular workers is prominent in Japan, while this 
kind of distinction is subtle in the United States. Second, the hiring market for new 
graduates in Japan is isolated from the rest of the labor market and majority of Japanese new 
graduates move on full-time regular jobs right after graduation, while transition to stable 
employment in the United States takes several years around graduation. 
Compared to the other OECD countries, Japan and the United States are at the opposite 
extremes as to the prevalence of job shopping among young workers. According to Table 4.7 
of OECD (1996), the average number of employers per year held by young persons after 
leaving school is 0.86 for American men and 0.17 for Japanese men, the highest and the 
lowest among Germany, Japan, Norway, Great Britain and the United States. Other factors 
reported in OECD (1996), such as the employment to population rate among 20-24 year 
olds and the proportion of the youth in total labor force, are similar and not very different 
from the OECD average. Fixed-term contracts and other “non-standard” employment in 
some European countries bear similarities to Japanese non-regular workers in the sense that 
they provide a loophole in strict dismissal regulations and these workers receive lower 
training opportunities and lower wages than regular workers. 
 
                                                 
9We have confirmed this by plotting annual earnings over hours worked using the March CPS. 
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| 4 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Defining a Cohort and the Earnings Equation 
ur sample consists of Japanese men and American white men who completed their 
education in 1983 or later and have potential experience in the range of one to 
twelve years. We restrict our sample to men in order to avoid additional 
complications from the labor supply behavior of married women, which is quite different in 
the United States and Japan. We also drop non-whites from the sample of American men to 
keep away from issues related to racial disparities.10 
Our primary sources of data for Japanese men are the Special Survey of the Labour Force 
Survey (Roudouryoku Chousa Tokubetsu Chousa; 1986-2001) and the Detailed Supplement to 
the Labour Force Survey (Roudouryoku Chousa Tokutei Chosahyo; 2002-2005), both 
conducted by the Statistics Bureau. The Special Survey was conducted annually in February 
until 2001, and each year’s sample consists of about 90,000 individuals older than 15 in 
about 40,000 randomly drawn households. In 2002, the annual Special Survey was replaced 
with the monthly detailed supplement with a sample size of 23,000 individuals; to avoid 
seasonality bias, we use February samples only. Both surveys are cross sectional and include 
the same questions on annual earnings, detailed employment status and employer 
characteristics, and basic demographic characteristics. 
We use the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey, conducted by the Census 
Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to do the same exercise for American men. The 
March supplement to the Current Population Survey is also cross sectional, consists of a 
random sample of households and contains most of the key variables in a comparable form. 
The sample size varies from about 100,000 in the 1980s to 200,000 individuals in the 2000s. 
The primary dependent variable is log real annual earnings. This is total income from salary 
and wages (excluding self employed persons in incorporated business) of the person in the 
last year, deflated by the consumer price index. Note that income from other sources is not 
included. Construction of the variable is described in Appendix. Most of the other 
dependent variables including employment status, weekly hours and part-time status are 
directly taken from the survey questionnaires and measured in the reference week of each 
survey. The measure of regional labor market conditions for Japan is the unemployment 
rates for 10 regions based on the monthly Labour Force Survey, which are available since 
1983. For the United States, we use the state unemployment rates issued by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics as the Local Area Unemployment Statistics. The Japanese regions are on 
average one-fifth the size of the average American state, while having twice the average 
population. 
We define a cohort as a group of people who entered the labor market in the same year and 
region or state, and then assign each person a vector of past and current regional 
unemployment rates based on his cohort. Since both the Labour Force Survey and the 
Current Population Survey are cross sectional datasets lacking detailed employment history, 
                                                 
10Though limited to Americans, Kondo (2007b) examines how the effect of graduating during a 
recession differs across race and gender. 
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we have to compute the year of graduation from the year of birth and educational 
background. Students in Japan typically receive job offers by the autumn of their last year of 
enrollment, while they graduate in March of the following year. Thus, we define entry-year  
y  for the Japanese sample as follows: year of birth + 6 + schooling for those born in April-
December, and year of birth + 5 + schooling for those born in January-March.11 For the U.S. 
sample, we compute year of graduation  y   as year of survey -- age + 6 + the highest grade 
attended. This corresponds to the year of graduation for a person who entered elementary 
school at age 6 and went straight to the highest grade. Also, we have to use the region/state of 
current residence as the best available proxy for the region/state of residence at entry. The 
next section examines the adequacy of this definition and discusses reservations that come 
from measurement errors. 
We estimate the effects of the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market on current 
earnings and various employment outcomes net of region-fixed components and year-fixed 
components. It is also necessary to control for temporary macro shocks at the time of the 
survey because unemployment rates may be auto-correlated, and the effect of the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate is itself worth estimating. Thus, the basic form of the 
earnings equation to be estimated is written as follows:  
iyryrrtittrytyrytityr tuuI εμθηϕδγβ +++++′++= −− X)()(log …(1) 
where  ityrI   is annual earnings of individual  i   who left school in year  y   and in region  r   
observed in year  t  ,  yru   and  tru   are the unemployment rates at entry and at present, and  
itX   is other control variables including educational background and potential experience in 
year  t  .  tϕ   is a survey-year fixed effect,  rη   is a region fixed effect,  rθ   is the coefficient of 
linear trend, which varies with region, and  yμ   is an entry-year fixed effect. The remaining 
errors are denoted by  iyrε  . Estimated standard errors are clustered for year and region of 
entry, i.e.  iyrε   is assumed to be the sum of a cohort-specific random shock  yrε   and an 
individual shock  iε~  . 
We allow the coefficients of the unemployment rates,  β   and  γ  , to vary with the years 
since entry to see the persistence of the effect. Ideally, we would like to estimate separate  β   
and  γ   by every single year of potential experience. However, in consideration of the sample 
size of each cohort, we choose a more parsimonious specification with separate  β  s and  γ  s 
for four ranges of potential experience (1-3, 4-6, 7-9 and 10-12 years). To estimate the effect 
on employment status, we modify equation (1) into the probit model. 
 
4.2 Are Japanese and American Data Comparable? 
Since the comparison of patterns across the less and the more educated groups between 
Japan and the United States is a kind of differences-in-differences in a very broad sense, we 
                                                 
11The Japanese Labor Force Survey does not ask years of education, but asks the school attended. 
Thus, we define years of education as follows: 9 for jr. high school graduates, 12 for high school 
graduates, 14 for jr/tech college graduates, 16 for college graduates and more. 
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need to check the comparability of Japanese and American data before the main analyses. 
First, let us compare summary statistics of the micro datasets shown in Table 1. American 
men are on average more educated, and the earnings gap between the more educated group 
and the less educated group is larger for American men. Nevertheless, within each group by 
educational background, the two datasets look fairly similar except that the employment rate 
is slightly higher for Japanese men. The average sample size per cohort (defined by 
region/state and year of graduation) is 222 for Japanese men and 135 for American men. 
On the other hand, the unemployment rates in Japan and the United States have moved 
quite differently. Figure 1 plots the national average unemployment rates and the minimum 
and the maximum of region/state unemployment rates over time for Japan and the United 
States in 1983-2003. Obviously, both the level of the average unemployment rate and the 
variation across states are much greater for the United States than Japan. Therefore, 1% rise 
in the unemployment rate could have a greater impact in Japan than in the United States, 
just because of the differences in the average level. Also, the overall trend is upward in Japan 
and downward in the United States, suggesting the importance of controlling for year effects. 
Further, Table 2 shows summary statistics of the regional unemployment rates, both raw 
levels and net of the year- and the region/state- fixed effects and the region/state specific 
linear trend. Variation net of these fixed effects and trend terms is essential for identification. 
Admittedly, a large part of the variation in the raw rates is absorbed by the fixed effects; 
especially, R2 for the Japanese regional rates is as high as 0.96, while that for the American 
state rates is 0.84. This could be partly because the Japanese data has fewer data points and 
the fixed effects are over fitted. Yet, studies on the wage curve in Japan show that regional 
unemployment rates have significant impacts on contemporaneous wages even with controls 
for region fixed effects and time dummies (Montgomery 1994, Poot and Doi 2005). Thus, 
we believe that we can identify the effect of the unemployment rate at entry net of region 
and year dummies as well. 
Since we use the region of current residence as a proxy for the region of residence at entry, 
measurement errors due to migration across regions attenuate the estimated effect of the 
unemployment rate at entry. The five-year migration rate across regions of Japanese men of 
relevant ages is about 10% or less, while the five year migration rate across states of American 
men is 15-20%.12 Thus, attenuation bias due to measurement errors will be greater for 
Americans. However, the relative gap in migration rates between college educated and not 
college educated is fairly similar in Japan and the United States. Although the 5-year 
migration rate across regions in Japan by age and education is unavailable, the migration rate 
across prefectures by age and education is available. Under an ad hoc assumption that the 
share of the migration across prefectures within a region in the total across-prefecture 
migration is the same across groups with different educational background, the 5-year 
migration rate across region for 25-34 year-old Japanese men without college education 
would be about 6%, and that for 25-34 year-old with college education would be about 14%. 
The across-state 5-year migration rate of 25-39 year-old Americans with college education is 
                                                 
12The five year migration rate across regions in Japan is 13.3% for 20-24 years old men, 10.0% for 
25-29 years old men and 8.2% for 30-34 years old men. The migration rate across states is 18.5% for 
20-24 years old American men (including blacks), 19.7% for 25-29 years old and 15.3% for 30-34 
years old. Calculated from the Population Census in 2000 of each country. 
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26.0% and that of without college education is 13.5%, according to the cross tabulation 
from Census 2000 by Franklin (2003).13 
Another source of attenuation bias is errors in the year of graduation. Errors in the 
graduation year for Japanese high school graduates are negligible, and those for college 
graduates are mostly within 1 or 2 years. Admittedly, our definition of the year of graduation 
is noisier for American men: about 2% of 20-year-old white men in the CPS are still enrolled 
in high schools, and 16% of 24-year-old white men are enrolled in colleges.14 
Business cycles may affect schooling choice. First, let us check the effect on the completed 
education. Panel (A) of Table 3 shows the effect of unemployment rates around high school 
completion on the likelihood of college education among adult men. The dependent variable 
is an indicator of college education, and the control variables are dummies for year of birth 
and region of residence. The sample consists of 25 year-old or older men born after 1966, 
and the standard errors are clustered for region-birth year groups. The estimated effect for 
Japanese men is not statistically significant and varies in sign. Although the effect of 
unemployment rate at age 19 looks substantial, the standard error is huge and also 
contradicts the result of no effect on college enrolment in Panel (C). On the other hand, a 
recession at high school completion slightly increases the likelihood of having college 
education among American men. 
Next, Panels (B) and (C) of Table 3 show the effect of the contemporaneous local 
unemployment rate on enrollment for a subsample of a specific age (e.g. 18 years old), 
following Card and Lemieux (2000). The sample contains all men in the relevant ages, and 
the table shows coefficients from probit model with year and region/state dummies in the 
right hand side. High school enrolment in Japan is not correlated with business cycles.15 Also, 
the correlation between the college enrolment rate and the unemployment rate suggests that 
a recession may make some people to stay in college for another year but does not affect the 
decision upon high school graduation in Japan.16 Note that the deferred graduation is not 
                                                 
13This tabulation includes non-whites and women. 
14Since many Americans graduate schools in one year later than the predicted entry, we have tried an 
alternative definition: the birth year + 7 + schooling. It does not change the results much. 
15The number of observation who are not enrolled among 16-18 years old is too small to run separate 
regression by single age, and the number of observations enrolled to high school and older than 20 is 
too small to run regressions. 
16This result might sound contradicting to the existing studies in Japan that show that worse labor 
market opportunities for high school graduates are associated to higher college enrolment rates. In 
fact, according to the School Census, the ratio of high school graduates proceeding to college started 
to rise around 1992, coinciding with the upturn of the unemployment rate. However, as Ariga 
(2005) emphasizes, this rise is largely attributed to the expansion of college capacity relative to the 
number of high school graduates. On one side, the number of colleges started to increase in the end 
of 1980s thanks to deregulation; on the other side, the number of high school graduates started to 
decrease around in the early 1990s after the second baby boomers (born in 1971-1974) finished high 
school. Since the most of the existing studies that find significant correlation between business cycle 
and college enrolment rate employ linear or quadratic trend and do not control for more flexible year 
fixed effects, chances are that they are picking up the spurious correlation in the early 1990s. 
Incidentally, the ratio of high school graduates proceeding to college stopped rising as the decrease of 
18-year-old population slowed down around 2000, while the unemployment rate kept rising until 
2002. 
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captured in the Japanese Labor Force Survey since it asks the diploma/degree obtained by the 
respondent, instead of years of schooling. On the other hand, a recession increases high 
school enrollment of 18-year-old American men, consistent with Card and Lemieux (2000), 
and it also increases college enrollment of 19- and 21- year-old American men slightly. 
However, the effect on college enrollment is small, and there is no significant effect of 
unemployment rate in the previous year on 20- and 22-year old men suggesting that a 
substantial part of the increased college entrants quit in a year.17 Overall, the effect of 
business cycle on schooling choice is small. 
Further, to assess whether people who proceed to colleges during a recession are differently 
selected from those who proceed to colleges during a boom, we estimate the correlation 
between the unemployment rate at age 18 and future wages for college graduates. The 
unemployment rate at age 18 is unlikely to have any direct effect on earnings after 
graduation from college. Thus, if there is a significant correlation, it is likely to be due to 
sorting on unobserved ability. Table 4 reports the result. Although the unemployment rate at 
age 18 is slightly positively correlated with earnings after graduating from college, the four 
coefficients are jointly insignificant and most of the individual coefficients are also 
insignificant in both countries. At least, there is no evidence that selection of students 
proceeding to college during a recession goes in an opposite direction in Japan than in the 
United States. 
To summarize, both the attenuation bias and the size of average unemployment rate will 
make the estimates for American men smaller than those for Japanese men. However, the 
difference between more and less educated Japanese men and that between more and less 
educated American men will be comparable. 
 
                                                 
17Card and Lemieux (2000) also conclude the effect of local labor market condition on college 
enrollment is weak. Their result suggests the effect of cohort size on the college enrollment rate is 
substantial in the United States, too. 
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| 5 | RESULTS 
5.1 Effects of the Unemployment Rate at Entry 
able 5 reports the estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate at entry and the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate on log real annual earnings. The estimated 
equations are exactly the same as equation (1); the coefficient of the unemployment 
rate at entry to the labor market corresponds to  β  , which is allowed to vary with 
experience by taking interactions with dummy indicators for 3-year potential experience 
categories. Figure 2 plots the estimated effect of the unemployment rate at entry on current 
earnings over potential experience. A high unemployment rate at entry has a very persistent 
negative effect for Japanese men, especially for the less educated group. 1% rise in the 
unemployment rate at entry leads to 7-5% earning losses for over 12 years for the group 
without college education. The effect is smaller and gradually fading, although still fairly 
persistent, for the more educated group; the initial loss is 4.6% and the gap gradually fades 
up to 2.3 %. Turning to American men, the unemployment rate at entry has only a 
temporary effect for the less educated group, in a sharp contrast to the almost permanent 
effect for their Japanese counterpart. The effect for more educated Americans is gradually 
fading in about 10 years and fairly close to the estimates by existing studies using the data of 
college graduates in North America from other sources (Kahn 2006, Oreopoulos et al 2006). 
The difference in relative pattern across the less and the more educated groups is striking. 
Provided that the less educated workers are less geographically mobile, the potential 
attenuation biases described in the previous section affect college graduates more than high 
school graduates. Nevertheless, all the difference between less educated and more educated 
Japanese men is not likely to be attributed to such biases. First of all, we observe the opposite 
pattern for the American men, which should be subject to the same kind of biases. Also, 
Ohtake and Inoki (1997) report that high school graduates who enter the labor market when 
the national unemployment rate is high earn lower wages, while the correlation for college 
graduates is smaller and statistically insignificant. We have confirmed the same result by 
regressions without fixed effects.18 
Lastly, the effect of the contemporaneous unemployment rate on earnings among less 
educated groups shows an interesting contrast between Japan and the United States. In Japan, 
high school graduates become less sensitive to contemporaneous business cycles as they get 
                                                 
18Though not reported, we have tried various specification checks including adding interaction of 
unemployment rates and indicators for business cycle upturns, restricting the sample to older cohorts 
that graduated before 1996 and different combination of region- and year- fixed effects. The effect of 
unemployment doesn’t seem to vary between upturns and downturns, and the results for older 
cohorts are quite similar to that for the entire sample reported in this paper. Except that the 
difference between the less and the more educated groups in Japan tend to be over estimated without 
controls for survey year and region-specific trend, the inclusion of the fixed effects does not change 
the estimates substantially either. We have also tried expanding the American sample back to the 
cohorts who graduated in 1976; the effect of a recession at entry becomes more negative and 
persistent for the less educated group (perhaps because the recession in 1982 that affected the blue-
collar intensive industries more) and the difference between the more and the less educated groups 
becomes subtle, but the relative pattern is not reversed. 
T 
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older. The reason is not very clear to us; the prevailing long-term contracts alone cannot 
explain this well because earnings of college graduates are somewhat sensitive to the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate. Perhaps bonuses may increase more for more 
educated workers during booms. It is true that less educated workers are more likely to lose 
jobs; however, it is hard to think that they are more likely to stay unemployed and report 
zero earnings for the entire year than compromise on lower paying jobs and report low but 
positive earnings; in fact, the effect of unemployment at entry on the likelihood of reporting 
zero earnings is statistically insignificant (see Appendix). On the other hand, earnings of the 
less educated group are more sensitive to business cycles in the United States. This is 
consistent with existing evidence for costs of a recession born disproportionately by less 
skilled workers (e.g. Hines, Hoynes and Krueger 2001). This contrast implies that the labor 
markets for low skilled workers may work in a quite different manner in Japan and in the 
U.S. 
Table 6 shows the effect of 1% rise in the unemployment rate at entry on the likelihood of 
being employed in the reference week of the survey. The unemployment rate at entry has a 
persistent negative effect for less educated Japanese men, like the effect on earnings. The 
effect for less educated American men is negative and marginally significant, but the size of 
the effect is small. The effect is almost zero and statistically insignificant for the more 
educated groups both in Japan and in the United States, consistent with the existence 
evidence for negligible effect on employment for college graduates by Oreopoulos et al 
(2006) and Kahn (2006). 
To look at the effect on hours worked, we have to restrict the sample to those employed in 
the reference week because the data on hours worked is not available for those who are not 
employed. Since the unemployment rate at entry has a negative effect on the likelihood of 
being employed only for less educated Japanese men, the estimated effect on hours worked 
conditional on being employed may be biased upward for this group. Nevertheless, the 
upper panel of Table 7 shows that the estimated effect of the unemployment rate at entry to 
hours worked for Japanese high school graduates is negative and jointly significant, while the 
effect on college graduates is not statistically distinct from zero. Also, there is no statistically 
significant effect for Americans, either in the less educated and the more educated groups. In 
any case, the effect on hours worked is very small compared to the effect on earnings; a 1 % 
rise in the unemployment rate would change weekly hours by less than one hour. It suggests 
that the negative effect on earnings comes from fall in wages per hour and/or decline in 
employment. 
Even though the overall effect on average hours is small, there can be a significant effect on 
full-time/part-time status. The lower panel of Table 7 shows the effect on the likelihood of 
being full-time.19 The effect is negative and persistent for less educated Japanese men, and 
weaker and marginally significant for less educated American men. There is no statistically 
significant negative effect for the more educated groups and the overall pattern across the 
four groups is similar to the effect on employment and hours of work. 
To summarize: we find persistent negative effects of graduating during a recession on 
subsequent earnings and employment for less educated Japanese men. On the other hand, 
                                                 
19Fulltime worker is those who worked 35 hours or more in the reference week, both in the CPS and 
the Japanese Labor Force Survey. 
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the effect on earnings for less educated American men is only temporary and the effect on 
employment for them is only marginally significant. The effect on earnings is significantly 
negative for more educated Japanese and American men, but weaker compared to the effect 
for less educated Japanese men. Also, there is no effect on employment, hours worked and 
full-time/part-time status for the more educated groups. 
 
5.2 Further Evidence for Chronic Unstable Employment 
The persistent negative effect on employment for less educated Japanese men suggests that a 
part of the negative effect on earnings comes from unstable employment among them. In 
this section, we try to go into the relationship between the chronic unstable employment we 
argued in Section 2 and the loss of earnings observed in Table 5, although unavailability of 
information about the first job allows us to show only some suggestive evidence. 
First, if a recession at entry lowers the likelihood of having a regular job and it really affects 
the earnings, adding employment status in the right hand side of equation (1) should weaken 
the effect of the unemployment rates at entry. We can test these hypothesis directly because 
the Japanese Labor Force Survey asks each employed person (excluding self-employed) 
whether he/she is employed as a “regular” employee.20 Since more productive people tend to 
sorted into stable employment in general, we take an average over cells defined by region, 
year of entry and survey year so that sorting within cohort is canceled out: 
yrtyrrttyrtrytyryttyrtyr tuuRI εμθηϕδγβα +++++′+++= −− X)()(log …(2) 
R   is the ratio of regular employee in the population, and the bars above variables indicate 
the average of each cohort. 
Table 8 reports the estimated effect of a recession at entry at the cohort level. First, column 1 
confirms that worse labor market conditions at entry lower the ratio of regular employees 
among less educated Japanese men. Also, the effect is weaker and statistically insignificant for 
the more educated group. This is not surprising given that the effect on employment 
reported in Table 6 is persistently negative only for the less educated group. Column 2 
reports the estimated effect of the ratio of regular employees on the average log annual 
earnings, implying that a substantial part of the effect of unemployment rate at entry for less 
educated Japanese men can be attributed to the reduced share of regular employment. 
Compared to Table 5, the negative effect of the unemployment rate at entry is reduced by 
3% for the less educated group with experience less than 7 years, but the reduction is modest 
for the more educated group. The coefficient of being an seishain decreases with experience, 
perhaps because what really matters is the status at entry while the dummy variable refers to 
the contemporaneous employment status. 
                                                 
20This classification is based on how their employers call them. The exact Japanese word 
corresponding to “regular” here is “seiki-no”. There is another definition of “regular employees”, 
which means those whose employment contracts do not specify termination date. Although the two 
classifications are determined independently from each other, the latter category based on the length 
of contract includes almost everyone classified as “regular” based on how they are called. We decide 
to use the classification based on how they are called because the classification based on the length of 
contract includes a significant number of part-time workers, who are not usually considered as 
seishain. 
 17
Second, if the loss of earnings is actually born mainly by people who are kept out of regular 
employment, the effect of the unemployment rate at entry on earnings should be stronger in 
the lower part of the earnings distribution because provisional workers and unemployed 
people are concentrated to that part. To see this, we estimated the effect at 25 percentile and 
75 percentile by quantile regression: 25 percentile roughly corresponds to the border 
between regular and provisional employees, while most people around 75 percentile have a 
regular job. The estimated coefficients reported in Table 9 show that the negative effect of a 
recession at entry operates stronger at 25 percentile than 75 percentile in Japan, while the 
difference between the two percentiles are negligible or even opposite in the United States.21 
Also, among Japanese, the difference between the two percentiles is greater and statistically 
more significant for the less educated group. The negative effect of a recession at entry is 
strongest for people who are the most likely to fall into unstable employment due to the 
recession in Japan. 
 
                                                 
21Further examination of heterogeneous effects among Canadian college graduates by Oreopoulos et 
al (2006) show a complicated pattern: on one hand, the effect is stronger for workers who entered 
better paying firms at entry, on the other hand, the effect is stronger for workers scores with lower 
predicted earnings based on the characteristics of college programs they attended. These two factors 
should be canceling out each other in our cross sectional sample. 
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| 7 | CONCLUDING REMARKS 
ntering the labor market during a recession has a persistent negative effect on earnings 
for young Japanese men. The effect is stronger and more persistent for the less 
educated group, especially those in the lower part of earnings distribution. Moreover, 
a recession at entry not only lowers the annual earnings, but also raises the likelihood of non-
employment and part-time employment for them, and a considerable part of the negative 
effect on earnings is the effect through the lower likelihood of regular, stable employment. In 
contrast, the negative impact of graduating from high school during a recession on earnings 
is temporary for less educated American men, while we observe a modestly persistent 
negative effect for more educated American men, consistent with the existing studies that 
focus on college graduates. 
The existing studies that focus on college graduates draw on the theory of search frictions 
and implicit long-term contracts to explain the persistent but fading negative effect of a 
recession at entry. Following their logic, the effect of a recession at entry is expected to fade 
faster for less educated workers because they are more likely to be laid off and lose the 
advantage of obtaining a good first job, and our result for American white men confirm it. In 
contrast, we show theoretical possibility that the adverse selection of non-regular workers and 
unemployed people may produce a negative effect of entering the labor market in a recession 
at the cohort level. Our empirical results provide some suggestive evidence that the stronger 
effect for less educated Japanese men comes from chronic non-regular, unstable employment 
caused by the isolated hiring market for new graduates and duality between regular and non-
regular employees in Japan, both of which do not exist in the United States. 
That the cost of a recession at entry is born disproportionately by relatively disadvantaged 
people raises a serious concern: the cohorts that suffer from the loss of earnings on average 
also experience greater earnings inequality between less and more educated people, since the 
effect of a recession at entry is weaker for the more educated group. Furthermore, poverty 
concentrated to particular cohorts might severely weigh down the social security system and 
cause social unrest. Although coming up with specific policy recommendation is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is worth bearing in mind that a persistent penalty for the 





APPENDIX: EARNINGS DATA 
The Japanese Labour Force Survey asks “Earnings from employed work (including not 
incorporated self-employment)”. The respondent chooses one of the following categories: 0, 
< 50, 50-99, 100-149, 150-199, 200-299, 300-399, 400-499, 500-699, 700-999, 1000-
1499, 1500- for 1996-2005; 0, < 100, 100-199, 200-299, 300-399, 400-499, 500-699, 700-
999, 1000-1499, 1500- for 1986-1995 (in 10,000 yen). We define the nominal earnings as 
the middle value of each earnings category. For the top category, we set 2,100 following the 
convention of dealing with the CPS top coding (in any case, very few observations are in this 
category). Then, we divide the nominal earnings with the regional Consumer Price Index 
normalized so that the national average takes 1 in 2000. 
For the March CPS, we use “PEARNVAL - total persons earnings” as the nominal annual 
earnings. This is the sum of wage and salary income and income from self-employment 
(including farm). Although this is in principle a continuous variable, 62% of the 
observations with positive earnings are bunched at every $1,000 and about 23% are even 
bunched at every $5,000. Thus it is more or less similar to the category data in the Japanese 
survey. Negative earnings are replaced with zero. We divide the nominal earnings by the 
national Consumer Price Index normalized to take 1 in 2000. 
Table A1 summarizes the fraction with zero or missing earnings. Table B2 reports the effect 
of the unemployment rate at entry on the likelihood of reporting zero earnings or missing 
earnings. The unemployment rate at entry slightly raises the probability of lacking valid 
earnings data for the less educated groups, probably due to non-employment. Assuming that 
those with lower potential wages are more likely to lack valid earnings due to non-
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Japanese men, 
high school or less
Japanese men, jr. 
college or more 
American 
men, S <=12 
American 
men, S > 12 
Sample size 53,557 39,592 63,611 76,699 
  exp = 1-3 17,833 11,417 19,849 17,643 
  exp = 4-6 14,759 12,229 17,297 21,982 
  exp = 7-9 12,083 9,399 14,753 19,994 








Jr/tech college (2 
year): 11,383, 4 









15.4; S < 16: 
35,216 
Log real earnings (10,000yen in 2000) (100 dollars in 2000) 
  exp = 1-3 5.10 5.50 4.44 5.12 
  exp = 4-6 5.41 5.79 4.88 5.48 
  exp = 7-9 5.60 5.99 5.16 5.70 
  exp = 10-12 5.73 6.15 5.31 5.86 
Employed     
  exp = 1-3 76.5% 92.2% 73.9% 88.8% 
  exp = 4-6 88.5% 94.7% 81.6% 90.6% 
  exp = 7-9 90.5% 95.5% 84.8% 92.4% 
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate in Japan and the United States: 1983-2003
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Region/State Unemployment Rates 1983-2003  
 Obs Mean Std. deviation Min Max 
Japanese regions 210 3.21 1.23 1.3 6.7 
(net of region FE, year FE & region 
specific linear trend)  (0.00) (0.22) (-0.60) (0.89) 
American states 1071 5.74 1.95 2.3 17.4 
(net of state FE, year FE & state 
specific linear trend ) * 
 (0.00) (0.75) (-2.07) (3.27) 




Table 3: The Effect of the Local Unemployment Rate on the Enrollment Rates  
 
(A) Unemployment rate around completion of high school on Pr( schooling > 12 years) 
 
 Japanese American 
U. rate at age 18 age 19 age 18 age 19 
marginal effect 0.2% -1.1% 0.5% 0.3% 
coefficient 0.004 -0.027 0.013 0.007 
S.E.  (0.004)   (0.021) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
 
(B) Contemporaneous unemployment rate on high school enrolment rates 
 
 Japanese American 
Age current last current Last 
16 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002)
17 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)













19 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)
20 N/A N/A -0.001 0.000 
   (0.002) (0.002)
 
(C) Contemporaneous unemployment rate on college enrolment rates 
 
 Japanese American 
Age current last current Last 
18 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
19 0.018 0.020 0.012 0.013 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.005) (0.005) 
20 0.000 -0.011 0.003 0.006 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.005) (0.005) 
21 0.062 0.086 0.004 0.010 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.005) (0.004) 
22 -0.029 0.040 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) 
23 0.068 0.062 0.001 0.008 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004) 
24 0.027 0.029 0 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Note: Coefficients from probit regressions, with birth-year dummies and region/state 
dummies as covariates. Standard errors are clustered for birth-year and region/state. See the 
text for details.  
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Table 4: The Effect of Unemployment Rates at Age 18 on Future Wages for College 
Graduates 
 









>= 13 yrs 
U at age18     
 ×experience 1-3 years 0.018 0.034 0.012 0.005 
  (0.033)   (0.018)  (0.007) (0.005) 
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.005 0.014 0.009 0.011 
  (0.027)   (0.015)  (0.005) (0.004) 
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.003 0.026 0.009 0.004 
  (0.024)   (0.016)  (0.005) (0.004) 
 ×experience 10-12 years 0.000 0.017 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.023)   (0.019)  (0.005) (0.004) 
Contemporaneous U     
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.064 -0.064 -0.014 -0.011 
  (0.021)   (0.018)  (0.011) (0.008) 
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.034 -0.040 -0.031 -0.024 
  (0.020)   (0.017)  (0.009) (0.007) 
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.018 
  (0.021)   (0.017)  (0.012) (0.008) 
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.019 -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 
  (0.021)   (0.018)  (0.013) (0.009) 
Observations 18,053 27,577 38,769 72,226 
R2 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.16 
 
Note: Cohort-clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Other controls included are 
potential experience, education (dummies for the Japanese sample, years of schooling for the 
American sample), birth year dummies, region dummies, survey year dummies and region-
specific linear trends.   
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Table 5: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry and the Contemporaneous 
Unemployment Rate on Log Real Annual Earnings 
 
 Japanese Americans 
 High school College S<=12 S>12 
U at entry to the market     
×experience 1-3 years -0.069 -0.046 -0.031 -0.015 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) 
×experience 4-6 years -0.072 -0.042 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) 
×experience 7-9 years -0.051 -0.031 0.002 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
×experience 10-12 years -0.063 -0.023 0.010 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) 
Contemporaneous U     
×experience 1-3 years -0.050 -0.050 -0.042 -0.013 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
×experience 4-6 years -0.016 -0.038 -0.043 -0.022 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) 
×experience 7-9 years -0.010 -0.032 -0.036 -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) 
×experience 10-12 years 0.012 -0.024 -0.033 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) 
Observations 47,469 38,017 57,635 72,226 
R2 0.23 0.27 0.17 0.16 
 
Note: Cohort-clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Other controls included are 
potential experience, education (dummies for the Japanese sample, years of schooling for the 
American sample), graduation year dummies, region dummies, survey year dummies and 
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Figure 2: The effect of 1% rise of the unemployment rate at entry on log real annual earnings
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Table 6: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry on Employment Status 
 
 Japanese Americans 
 High school College
High 
school College 
Marginal effects     
U at entry     
×experience 1－3 years -3.26% -0.51% -0.67% -0.20% 
×experience 4－6 years -3.12% -0.08% -0.30% -0.12% 
×experience 7－9 years -3.75% 0.62% -0.30% -0.13% 
×experience 10－12 years -3.93% -0.01% -0.55% -0.37% 
Contemporaneous U     
×experience 1－3 years -3.97% 0.25% -2.53% -0.64% 
×experience 4－6 years -3.71% 0.29% -2.20% -0.76% 
×experience 7－9 years -3.08% 0.70% -1.82% -0.72% 
×experience 10－12 years -2.26% 0.50% -1.76% -0.66% 
Probit Coefficients     
U at entry     
×experience 1－3 years -0.170 -0.061 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.055) (0.068) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 4－6 years -0.162 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 7－9 years -0.195 0.076 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.045) (0.068) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 10－12 years -0.204 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.042) (0.066) (0.003) (0.002) 
Contemporaneous U     
×experience 1－3 years -0.207 0.030 -0.025 -0.006 
 (0.048) (0.068) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 4－6 years -0.193 0.035 -0.022 -0.008 
 (0.042) (0.053) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 7－9 years -0.160 0.084 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.043) (0.054) (0.004) (0.002) 
×experience 10－12 years -0.118 0.061 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.005) (0.003) 
Sample size 53,513 39,562 63,611 76,699 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.051 0.059 0.026 
LR test statistics (H0: all =0) 28.02 3.86 7.83 4.52 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.43) (0.10) (0.34) 
 
Note: Cohort-clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Other controls included are 
potential experience, education (dummies for the Japanese sample, years of schooling for the 
American sample), graduation year dummies, region dummies, survey year dummies and 
region-specific linear trends. The null hypothesis for the LR test is that all coefficients of 
unemployment rates at entry interacted with potential experience are zero.  
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Table 7: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry on Hours Worked, 
Conditional on Being Employed  
 
(1) Hours worked in last week 
 
 Japanese Americans 
 High 
school College S<=12 S>12 
OLS Coefficients     
×experience 1－3 years -0.609 0.587 0.047 -0.051 
 (0.520 (0.474) (0.102) (0.094) 
×experience 4－6 years -0.356 0.551 0.018 0.022 
 (0.407 (0.396) (0.086) (0.077) 
×experience 7－9 years -0.933 0.324 0.035 0.101 
 (0.398 (0.426) (0.089) (0.080) 
×experience 10－12 years -0.838 0.570 0.031 0.029 
 (0.353 (0.398) (0.088) (0.073) 
Observations 46,169 37,660 50,250 68,430 
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.012 0.04 0.03 
F test statistics (H0: all =0) 2.65 0.77 0.08 0.61 
(p-value) (0.034) (0.546) (0.987) (0.658) 
 
(2) Pr( full-time | employed)  
 
 Japanese Americans 
 High school College S<=12 S>12 
Marginal effects     
×experience 1－3 years -2.4% 0.5% -0.5% -0.4% 
×experience 4－6 years -1.7% 0.4% -0.3% -0.4% 
×experience 7－9 years -2.2% 0.1% 0.2% -0.4% 
×experience 10－12 years -1.6% 1.4% -0.6% -0.2% 
Probit Coefficients     
×experience 1－3 years -0.161 0.053 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.065) (0.070) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 4－6 years -0.119 0.041 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.050) (0.058) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 7－9 years -0.152 0.012 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.003) (0.002) 
×experience 10－12 years -0.109 0.145 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.048) (0.071) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 46,169 37,660 51,435 70,087 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.019 0.032 0.022 
LR test statistics (H0: all 
=0) 
9.93 5.24 6.91 5.20 
(p-value) (0.042) (0.053) (0.141) (0.268) 
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Note: Cohort-clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Other controls included are the 
unemployment rate in survey year, potential experience, education (dummies for the 
Japanese sample, years of schooling for the American sample), graduation year dummies, 
region dummies, survey year dummies and region-specific linear trends. The null hypothesis 
for the F/LR tests is that all coefficients of unemployment rates at entry interacted with 
potential experience are zero. 
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Table 8: The Effect through Employment Status (seishain) on Earnings in Japan 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 (1) ratio of seishain  (2) average log real 
annual earnings 
  High school College 
High 
school College 
U at entry to the market     
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.062 -0.027 -0.033 -0.030 
 (0.017) (0.015)  (0.023)   (0.017)  
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.048 -0.011 -0.042 -0.037 
 (0.014) (0.013)  (0.018)   (0.015)  
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.031 0.003 -0.026 -0.032 
 (0.013) (0.012)  (0.017)   (0.014)  
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.022 0.000 -0.041 -0.025 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.016)   (0.015)  
Contemporaneous U     
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.046 -0.011 -0.007 -0.043 
 (0.014) (0.012)  (0.019)   (0.015)  
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.039 -0.008 0.011 -0.034 
 (0.012) (0.010)  (0.015)   (0.013)  
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.036 0.002 0.006 -0.035 
 (0.012) (0.010)  (0.015)   (0.013)  
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.021 -0.002 0.018 -0.025 
 (0.013) (0.011)  (0.016)   (0.014)  
Ratio of seishain     
×experience 1-3 years   0.651 0.566 
    (0.059)   (0.058)  
×experience 4-6 years   0.563 0.520 
    (0.057)   (0.059)  
×experience 7-9 years   0.451 0.396 
    (0.069)   (0.068)  
×experience 10-12 years   0.417 0.388 
     (0.084)   (0.083)  
Sample size 1,836 1,831 1,836 1,831 
R2 0.6 0.32 0.87 0.87 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each cohort is weighted by the number of 
observations in the original dataset. Other controls included are potential experience, 
education (ratio of high school drop outs or jr. college graduates), graduation year dummies, 
region dummies, survey year dummies and region-specific linear trends. 
 33
Table 9:  Coefficients of Unemployment Rate at Entry at 25-percentile and 75-
percentile 
 
 25 percentile 75 percentile F stats for (p-value) for 
test H0: 25% = 75% 
U at entry Japanese men, high school or less 
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.103 -0.011 15.56 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.000) 
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.114 -0.029 8.59 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.003) 
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.079 -0.021 6.99 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.008) 
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.073 -0.024 5.38 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) 
U at entry Japanese men, college or more 
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.043 -0.005 3.26 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.071) 
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.057 -0.021 2.22 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.136) 
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.029 -0.014 0.53 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.467) 
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.043 -0.003 3.46 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.063) 
U at entry American men, S<=12 
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.034 -0.024 0.69 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.406) 
 ×experience 4-6 years 0.010 -0.003 1.78 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.183) 
 ×experience 7-9 years 0.004 -0.003 0.63 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.426) 
 ×experience 10-12 years 0.014 0.005 1.40 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.236) 
U at entry American men, S>12 
 ×experience 1-3 years -0.013 -0.016 0.13 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.718) 
 ×experience 4-6 years -0.008 -0.009 0.01 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.911) 
 ×experience 7-9 years -0.006 -0.001 1.94 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.163) 
 ×experience 10-12 years -0.006 -0.002 0.30 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.586) 
 
Note: Standard errors computed by bootstrapping are in parenthesis. Other controls 
included are potential experience, education (dummies for Japanese sample, years of 
schooling for American sample), graduation year dummies, region dummies, survey year 
dummies and region-specific linear trends. 
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 Table A1: Fraction with Zero/Missing Earnings  
 
 Japanese men, 
high school or less
Japanese men, jr. 
college or more 
American 
white men, S 
<=12 
American 
white men, S > 
12 
exp = 1-3 19.1% 5.5% 13.8% 6.2% 
exp = 4-6 8.1% 3.7% 7.9% 5.4% 
exp = 7-9 6.9% 3.4% 7.2% 5.4% 
exp = 10-12 7.2% 2.7% 6.8% 6.6% 
 
 
Table A2: The Effect of the Unemployment Rates on the Likelihood of Zero/Missing 
Earnings Probit Coefficients  
 
 Japanese Americans 
 High school College S<=12 S>12 
U at entry to the market     
×experience 1－3 years 0.068 0.027 0.036 0.023 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.013) (0.015) 
×experience 4－6 years 0.060 0.123 0.024 0.005 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.012) (0.013) 
×experience 7－9 years 0.036 0.035 0.015 -0.008 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.013) (0.013) 
×experience 10－12 years 0.033 0.010 0.021 0.001 
 (0.033) (0.053) (0.013) (0.013) 
Contemporaneous U     
×experience 1－3 years 0.052 0.020 0.052 -0.015 
 (0.041) (0.054) (0.015) (0.015) 
×experience 4－6 years 0.059 -0.013 0.032 0.003 
 (0.031) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015) 
×experience 7－9 years 0.036 0.001 0.046 -0.002 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016) 
×experience 10－12 years 0.017 0.041 0.027 -0.005 
 (0.035) (0.051) (0.022) (0.019) 
Observations 52,342 39,000 63,611 76,699 
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.180 0.077 0.026 
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